

Message Text

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L-03 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15
TRSE-00 EB-08 /086 W
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O R 191454Z JUL 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3119
SECDEF WASHDC
ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

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FROM US REP MBFR

USSALTTWO

USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE. ALL OTHER MBFR MISSIONS ROUTINE.

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JULY 20 AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NAC

AT ITS JULY 19 MEETING, THE AD HOC GROUP APPROVED IN
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GENERAL TERMS THE OUTLINE TO BE USED BY NETHERLANDS
REP (DE VOS) IN MAKING REGULAR AHG ORAL REPORT TO THE
NAC ON JULY 20. NETHERLANDS REP WILL BE ASSISTED BY
US DEPREP AND NORWEGIAN REP (OFSTAD). NETHERLANDS REP
WILL DRAW ON MATERIAL IN THE OUTLINE, NOT NECESSARILY
USING IT IN FULL. UNLIKE WRITTEN REPORTS TO THE NAC,
THE AD HOC GROUP DOES NOT UNDERTAKE WORD-FOR-WORD

APPROVAL OF THESE OUTLINES, WHICH ARE CONSIDERED
AS SPEAKING NOTES. THE TEXT OF THE JULY 20 ORAL
REPORT OUTLINE FOLLOWS BELOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. MY REPORT TODAY ON THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL
AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS COVERS DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE
LAST AD HOG GROUP ORAL REPORT TO THE NAC ON 16 JUNE 1978
THROUGH THE CLOSE OF THE FIFTEENTH ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
ON 19 JULY 1978.

2. DURING THIS PERIOD, WESTERN NEGOTIATORS KEPT UP THE
PRESSURE FOR EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN APPROACH,
INCLUDING THE WESTERN INITIATIVE OF 19 APRIL 1978. FOR THEIR
PART, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES STRESSED THAT THEIR 8 JUNE 1978
PROPOSALS PROVIDED A COMPROMISE BASIS FOR EARLY ACHIEVEMENT OF
A FIRST REDUCTION AGREEMENT, AND THEY GAVE SOME ADDITIONAL
EXPLANATIONS OF THOSE PROPOSALS. THE EAST/WEST DISCUSSION OF
MILITARY MANPOWER DATA CONTINUED. WE HAVE ALREADY SUBMITTED TO
THE COUNCIL A REPORT SUMMARIZING THE NEW POINTS WE HAVE LEARNED
ABOUT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS SINCE THE LAST WRITTEN REPORT ON 14
JUNE AS WELL AS ON THE DATA ISSUE.

3. WHILE AVOIDING ANY OVERALL CHARACTERIZATION TO THE
EAST OF THE 8 JUNE EASTERN PROPOSALS, WESTERN NEGOTIATORS HAVE
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SAID THAT THOSE PROPOSALS REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT MOVE ON
SEVERAL INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT THAT MANY
PROBLEMS REMAIN OPEN. IN THE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF
THE NEW EASTERN MOVE, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE GONE ON TO
SAY THAT, EVEN WHERE THE EAST APPEARED TO AGREE WITH THE WEST
IN PRINCIPLE, FOR EXAMPLE ON COLLECTIVITY, THE MEANS OF
IMPLEMENTATION CHOSEN BY THE EAST HAVE CREATED SERIOUS
PROBLEMS.

4. REGARDING THE DATA DISCUSSION, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES
HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE EAST'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF
PARITY DOES NOT YET REPRESENT PRACTICAL PROGRESS BECAUSE IT IS
BASED ON EASTERN DATA, BUT THAT THIS EASTERN MOVE ON PRINCIPLE
MAKES THE RESOLUTION OF THE DATA QUESTION ALL THE MORE URGENT.
EASTERN REACTIONS SUGGEST THAT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES
RECOGNIZE THIS FACT. BUT THEY HAVE GIVEN NO INDICATION OF
CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION ON DATA OR THAT THEY HAVE USED A
DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF FORCES TO BE COUNTED FROM THE WEST.
INSTEAD, THEY HAVE REPEATEDLY CHARGED THAT THE WEST HAS NOT AND
CANNOT PROVE ITS CLAIM THAT THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL EASTERN
NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER. MOREOVER, EASTERN
REPRESENTATIVES HAVE LATELY BEGUN OPENLY TO CHALLENGE THE WEST

TO PROVIDE ITS ESTIMATES OF THE MANPOWER STRENGTH OF INDIVIDUAL
EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

5. THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8 INCREASE THE FOCUS
ON EAST/WEST DIFFERENCES OVER DATA. THESE EASTERN PROPOSALS
ARE DIRECTLY DEPENDENT ON AGREEMENT ON DATA, IN PARTICULAR
BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ITS
GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BY THE AMOUNT BY WHICH THAT MANPOWER
EXCEEDED THE LEVEL OF 700,000 MEN. FROM THE WESTERN STANDPOINT,
THIS EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COMMON CEILING
PROVIDES A CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR ASYMMETRICAL MILITARY MANPOWER
REDUCTIONS, PROVIDED THAT THE EAST CAN EVENTUALLY BE BROUGHT TO
ACKNOWLEDGE THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER DISPARITY IN ITS FAVOR.
WE HAVE INCLUDED OTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THE DATA ISSUE IN A
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WRITTEN REPORT TO THE COUNCIL.

6. TO TURN TO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF
JUNE 8, AS REGARDS THE APPARENT POINTS OF AGREEMENT IN

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TRSE-00 EB-08 /086 W
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SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE
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PRINCIPLE, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE MEANS CHOSEN BY THE EAST TO IMPLEMENT THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY COULD RESULT IN A SITUATION WHERE THE TOTAL MILITARY MANPOWER OF THE WEST WAS HELD BELOW THE COMMON CEILING WHILE THE USSR COULD FULLY RESTORE ITS OWN WITHDRAWALS.

7. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT, DESPITE EASTERN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO LARGER SOVIET THAN US MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I, AND TO REDUCTION OF SELECTED AND DIFFERENT US AND SOVIET ARMAMENTS IN PHASE I, THE EAST IS ASKING THE WEST TO UNDERTAKE IN PHASE I NOT ONLY THOSE

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OBLIGATIONS WHICH THE WEST ITSELF HAS OFFERED, BUT ALSO WEIGHTY ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS INCLUDING BOTH UNIT REDUCTIONS AND FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II, AND THAT, IN RETURN, THE EAST IS OFFERING EASTERN OBLIGATIONS WHICH ARE FAR LESS THAN WHAT THE WEST HAS ASKED.

8. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE NOTED THAT MANY OF THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE WAY THE EAST WOULD IMPLEMENT THE JUNE 8 PROPOSALS RESULT FROM THE CONTINUED EASTERN INSISTENCE ON PLACING IDENTICAL OBLIGATIONS ON THE FORCES WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT, INGNORING THE DIFFERENCES IN GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THESE COUNTRIES.

9. WESTERN NEGOTIATORS HAVE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT, INSTEAD OF A GENERAL FIRST PHASE COMMITMENT ON THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS WHICH THE EAST HAD PREVIOUSLY SOUGHT FROM NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND WHICH THE WEST PROPOSED IN THE WESTERN APRIL 19 PROPOSALS, THE EAST WAS STILL ASKING FOR SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS IN THE FIRST PHASE REGARDING ALL MAJOR ELEMENTS OF SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CALLED UPON THE EAST TO APPLY MORE RESTRICTIVELY THE PROCLAIMED EASTERN POSITION THAT THE ACTUAL MODALITIES OF SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS SHOULD STRICTLY BE A MATTER OF SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE POINTED OUT THE UNACCEPTABLE NATURE OF THE EASTERN PROVISION THAT THE USSR COULD AT ITS OWN DISCRETION UNILATERALLY NULLIFY ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD IT BE DISSATISFIED AND HOW THE POINTS WHICH REMAINED TO BE DECIDED IN PHASE II WERE RESOLVED.

10. TO TURN NOW TO A DESCRIPTION OF THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES IN THIS PERIOD, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE MADE A VIGOROUS EFFORT TO PROMOTE THEIR 8 JUNE PROPOSALS
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AS A MAJOR CONCESSION WHICH SHOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS NEGOTIATION OF A FIRST REDUCTION AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES CLAIM THAT THE EAST HAS ACTED TO ACCOMMODATE THE WEST BY: (A) FOCUSING ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS BY DROPPING AIR FORCE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS; (B) SATISFYING WESTERN REQUIREMENTS AS REGARDS PARITY AND COLLECTIVITY; (C) ADOPTING A SELECTIVE AND DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH TO ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS; AND (D) AGREEING TO EQUAL PERCENTAGE US AND SOVIET MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE.

11. AS REGARDS THE WEST'S APRIL 19 PROPOSALS, THE EAST HAS STATED THAT THEY WERE A DEFINITE FORWARD MOVE. HOWEVER, THE EAST HAS STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A COLLECTIVE REDUCTION COMMITMENT, CLAIMING THAT IT COULD BE FULFILLED BY SOME WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITH ONLY A SYMBOLIC REDUCTION, AND HAS EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION COMMITMENTS. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ALSO CRITICIZED THE WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR THEIR FAILURE TO INCLUDE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS ON THE PART OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US.

12. IN RESPONDING TO WESTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT THEIR 8 JUNE PROPOSALS, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE NOT DENIED THAT THESE PROPOSALS THEORETICALLY COULD PERMIT RAPID INCREASE OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA TO THEIR PRE-REDUCTION LEVEL. THEY HAVE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WOULD, IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE WEST TO MAINTAIN ITS OWN OVERALL POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVEL. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE TERMED

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BOTH THESE EVENTUALITIES HYPOTHETICAL, AND SAID THAT A SPECIAL EAST-WEST AGREEMENT COULD COPE WITH SUCH A SITUATION SHOULD IT ARISE. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ALSO INVITED ALTERNATIVE WESTERN SUGGESTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS OF OPERATING A COLLECTIVE CEILING.

13. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THAT THEIR PROPOSALS LEAVE OPEN THE METHOD AND CONTENT OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY EXPECT NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES IN PRINCIPLE IN PHASE I TO REDUCE IN UNITS AND SUBUNITS AND TO
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INCLUDE SOME SELECTED ARMAMENTS IN THEIR REDUCTIONS.

14. WESTERN NEGOTIATORS, WHILE WELCOMING THE STEP TAKEN BY THE EAST ON 8 JUNE, HAVE EMPHASIZED THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ALREADY PROVIDED A REASONABLE BASIS FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND GENUINELY EQUITABLE OUTCOME. THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE 19 APRIL WESTERN INITIATIVE AND TO EMPHASIZE THAT THAT INITIATIVE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT EASTERN CONCERNS WHICH HAD BLOCKED ATTAINMENT OF A FIRST AGREEMENT. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ALSO CONTINUED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT ANY AGREEMENT MUST ACCORD WITH THE WESTERN REQUIREMENTS ON MANPOWER LIMITATIONS AND ON GENUINE MANPOWER PARITY BASED ON FACT.

15. IN A MORE GENERAL SENSE, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CONTINUED TO ACCUSE THE WEST OF FORCING AN ARMS RACE. THEY HAVE POINTED TO THE DECISIONS TAKEN AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, CONTRASTING THEM WITH THE AIMS OF THE UN/SSOD. IN THIS CONTEXT THE EAST HAS CONTINUED TO ADVOCATE ITS PROPOSAL FOR A FREEZE ON MILITARY MANPOWER FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

16. TO TURN TO SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS, I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THE AD HOC GROUP TO EMPHASIZE THAT EVENTS IN VIENNA OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS HAVE REINFORCED THE TACTICAL ADVISABILITY OF

ADDING AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE TO THE PROGRAM OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES PREVIOUSLY ADVANCED BY THE WEST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

17. AS REGARDS THE LOCAL EXAMINATION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IN VIENNA, THE PROCESS OF CLARIFYING THE MEANING OF THE PROPOSAL THROUGH QUESTIONING CAN NOW BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE
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BEEN LARGELY CONCLUDED EXCEPT FOR SOME MATTERS OF DETAIL.

18. IT IS FOR THE COUNCIL TO DECIDE WHETHER THE EASTERN PROPOSAL MERITS A WESTERN RESPONSE AND, IF SO, WHEN, AND OF WHAT KIND. AS SEEN FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA, THE AD HOC GROUP CAN OFFER THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS:

19. TO START WITH, THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8 MOVE FAIRLY FAR TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE WESTERN POSITION.

20. THAT IS, THE JUNE 8 PROPOSALS ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, WITH RELINQUISHMENT OF OBLIGATORY AIR FORCE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS; A COMMON MANPOWER CEILING; COLLECTIVITY OF MANPOWER LIMITATIONS, EQUALPERCENTAGE US AND SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS; SELECTIVE REDUCTION OF DIFFERENT US AND SOVIET ARMAMENTS IN PHASE I; AND FREEDOM OF ACTION FOR PARTICIPANTS REGARDING THEIR FORCE ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN EXPRESSLY LIMITED BY AN AGREEMENT.

21. THE WAYS THE EAST HAS CHOSEN TO APPLY OR IMPLEMENT

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THESE PRINCIPLES ARE OF COURSE NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE
WESTERN POSITION, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE DATA ISSUE, THE
SIZE OF EASTERN MANPOWER AND TANK REDUCTIONS, AND THE
OPERATION OF THE MANPOWER LIMITATIONS.

22. ONE LOGICAL COURSE, NOW THAT THE EAST HAS MOVED TO
ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE MANY ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION, WOULD
BE TO CONSOLIDATE THIS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE AND TO SEEK TO
BRING THE EAST TO DEVELOP ITS PROPOSED METHODS OF IMPLEMENTING
THESE PRINCIPLES CLOSER TO THE WESTERN POSITION.

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23. IN THIS SENSE, AS FAR AS NOW CAN BE DETERMINED, THERE
ARE SOME AREAS OF THE EASTERN POSITION WHICH MIGHT BE FURTHER
DEVELOPED BY THE WEST TOWARDS THE WESTERN APPROACH. THESE
INCLUDE: (A) THE EASTERN PROPOSALS FOR OPERATION OF THE
COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING, WHERE THE EAST HAS INVITED THE WEST
TO MAKE PROPOSALS OF ITS OWN; (B) THE EAST'S OFFER TO WITHDRAW

1,000 TANKS, WHICH APPEARS TO BE A NEGOTIATING OFFER; AND (C) THE TOPIC OF COMMITMENTS BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT.

24. EASTERN MOVEMENT ON THESE ISSUES WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM THE WEST. MOREOVER, THE EAST IS UNLIKELY TO ADJUST ITS POSITION ON THESE AND OTHER TOPICS UNLESS THERE IS A PRIOR WESTERN MOVE. THUS, IF THE WEST WISHES TO CONTINUE WITH THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING THE EASTERN POSITION TOWARDS THE WESTERN POSITION, A PROCESS WHOSE PARTIAL SUCCESS WAS MARKED BOTH BY THE EAST'S FEBRUARY 1976 PROPOSAL AS REGARDS PHASING, AND BY THE JUNE 8 EASTERN PROPOSALS, SOME WESTERN RESPONSE PROBABLY WILL BE NECESSARY.

25. AS TO THE QUESTION OF TIMING, THE EAST MAY NOT PRESS TOO SHARPLY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND FOR A RESPONSE AND WESTERN NEGOTIATORS CAN THEN REASONABLY CONTINUE TO STATE THAT THE WEST IS STILL CONSIDERING THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. BUT THIS EASTERN ATTITUDE IS NOT LIKELY TO LAST MUCH BEYOND THE MIDDLE OF THE NEXT ROUND. THEREFORE, IF IT SHOULD APPEAR UNDESIRABLE FOR THE WEST TO RESPOND WITH A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL OF THE KIND IT ADVANCED ON APRIL 19, THERE MAY BE SOME TACTICAL MERIT IN RESPONDING FAIRLY SOON ON A MORE LIMITED BASIS.

26. MEANWHILE, AS WE STATED IN OUR RECENT WRITTEN REPORT ON DATA, THE AD HOC GROUP SUGGESTS THAT THE COUNCIL
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MAY WISH TO EXAMINE HOW BEST TO PROSECUTE THE DATA DISCUSSION.
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